A inicio de los años 90 la sociedad cubana se enfrentaba a un proceso de profundas transformaciones internas como consecuencia de los cambios en la esfera de las relaciones internacionales, el recrudecimiento del bloqueo de Estados Unidos y la necesidad de insertarse en la nueva dinámica de las relaciones económicas mundiales después de desaparecida la URSS y el socialismo este-europeo. Todo ello tuvo un importante impacto en los valores de la sociedad cubana, especialmente en los jóvenes. En razón de ello, (...) la Asamblea nacional del Poder Popular convocó a una audiencia pública sobre la formación de valores en las nuevas generaciones, llevada a cabo los días 24 y 25 de abril de 1995. Este libro recoge las más importantes intervenciones presentadas desde diversos planos de análisis: filosófico (José Ramón Fabelo Corzo), histórico (Cintio Vitier), sociológico (María Isabel Domínguez), psicológico (Fernando González) y pedagógico (Gilberto García Batista). (shrink)

El Foro Global de Bioética en Investigación (GFBR por sus siglas en inglés) se reunió el 3 y 4 de noviembre en Buenos Aires, Argentina, con el objetivo de discutir la ética de la investigación con mujeres embarazadas. El GFBR es una plataforma mundial que congrega a actores clave con el objetivo de promover la investigación realizada de manera ética, fortalecer la ética de la investigación en salud, particularmente en países de ingresos bajos y medios, y promover colaboración entre países (...) del norte y del sur.a Los participantes en el GFBR provenientes de Latinoamérica incluyeron a eticistas, investigadores, miembros de comités de ética y representantes de autoridades sanitarias provenientes de Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panamá, Perú, Nicaragua y la República Dominicana. Una legítima preocupación por la protección de las mujeres embarazadas y sus embriones o fetos ha llevado a la mayoría de los países de la Región de las Américas a limitar la realización de estudios con mujeres embarazadas exclusivamente a aquellos estudios específicos sobre el embarazo, y a requerir la exclusión sistemática de las mujeres embarazadas o de las mujeres que quedan embarazadas en el curso del estudio. Ciertamente, a lo largo de la historia de la ética de la investigación, se ha creído erróneamente que proteger a una población es sinónimo de excluirla de los estudios. Se sabe ahora que proceder así implica exponer a riesgos mucho mayores a la población que se busca proteger. El embarazo implica cambios fisiológicos sustantivos e impacta profundamente la manera como el cuerpo metaboliza los medicamentos. Sin embargo, por evitar hacer investigación con mujeres embarazadas, no se ha producido la evidencia científica necesaria para tomar decisiones sobre tratamientos e intervenciones preventivas con dosis eficaces y seguras para ellas y sus embriones o fetos. A manera de ilustración, en el 2001 había en los Estados Unidos apenas más de una docena de medicamentos aprobados para uso en el embarazo (1) y en el 2011 la Food and Drug Administration (FDA) aprobó por primera vez en 15 años un medicamento para su uso en el embarazo (2). Como consecuencia de no haber producido la evidencia necesaria, se pone en riesgo la salud de las mujeres embarazadas cada vez que se les da atención médica. Las mujeres embarazadas se enferman y las mujeres enfermas se embarazan, y no se sabe si los medicamentos que se les da son eficaces o siquiera seguros para ellas y sus embriones o fetos. (shrink)

Is the societal-level of analysis sufficient today to understand the values of those in the global workforce? Or are individual-level analyses more appropriate for assessing the influence of values on ethical behaviors across country workforces? Using multi-level analyses for a 48-society sample, we test the utility of both the societal-level and individual-level dimensions of collectivism and individualism values for predicting ethical behaviors of business professionals. Our values-based behavioral analysis indicates that values at the individual-level make a more significant contribution to (...) explaining variance in ethical behaviors than do values at the societal-level. Implicitly, our findings question the soundness of using societal-level values measures. Implications for international business research are discussed. (shrink)

It is with great enthusiasm that Editora Contemporânea presents "Culture and Identity: Perspectives on the Human Sciences -1st Edition". This book is a profound and thought-provoking exploration of the intersection between culture and identity in contemporary society, offering an innovative look at themes that shape our understanding of the world. Culture and identity play fundamental roles in the complex web of society. More than mere concepts, they are living forces that shape our interactions, perceptions, and the very fabric of society. (...) This book highlights the intrinsic importance of these elements in constructing meanings, and connections and shaping the rich tapestry of human diversity. In an era marked by globalization and interconnectedness, understanding cultural dynamics and the nuances of identity becomes essential. "Culture and Identity: Perspectives in the Humanities" offers crucial insights into meeting contemporary challenges, promoting intercultural dialogues, addressing issues of inclusion, and recognizing the complexities of individual and collective identities. This volume not only critically analyzes cultural and identity issues, but also sheds light on the prospects of humanities research. From investigations into changing identities to analyses of cultural influences on community formation, the contributions in this book pave the way for new approaches and reflections in academia. We express our sincere gratitude to the dedicated contributors who made this first edition possible. Each author has brought a unique and valuable insight, enriching the dialog on culture and identity in the human sciences. Their collective efforts have resulted in a work that inspires and challenges, contributing to a profound understanding of human complexity. We invite readers to delve into the pages of this unique work. Discover the multifaceted perspectives on culture and identity that this book offers. May it inspire reflections, dialogues, and actions that promote a deeper and more inclusive understanding of human diversity. Editora Contemporânea thanks you for joining us on this journey of intellectual exploration and discovery. -/- . (shrink)

«Fortaleza» y «debilidad» son dos adjetivos que se han utilizado prolijamente en la literatura científica sobre institucionalismo para describir la permanencia o, por el contrario, la porosidad y maleabilidad de las reglas y principios rectores en los que están atrincheradas las instituciones que sobreviven en equilibrio y, por tanto, no son alteradas unilateralmente.

1. Hume e a Magna Carta: em torno do círculo da justiça, Maria Isabel Limongi; 2. Hume e o problema da justificação da resistência ao governo, Stephanie Hamdan Zahreddine; 3 O surgimento dos costumes da sociedade comercial e as paixões do trabalho, Pedro Vianna da Costa e Faria; 4. O sentido da crença: suas funções epistêmicas e implicações para a teoria política de Hume, Lilian Piraine Laranja; 5. O Status do Fideísmo na Crítica de Hume à Religião Natural, (...) Marília Côrtes de Ferraz; 6. Da imaterialidade da alma: a desconstrução mais incisiva de Hume de um pressuposto metafísico, Marcos César Seneda; 7. A “irresistibilidade” e a “inevitabilidade” das crenças naturais e o caráter normativo da epistemologia de Hume, Claudiney José de Sousa; 8. Filosofia e vida comum na epistemologia de Hume, Marcos Fonseca Ribeiro Balieiro; 9. Hume e o relativismo moral, Flávio Zimmermann; 10. Hume e a vivacidade das crenças morais, André Luiz Olivier da Silva; 11. Virtudes sociais e refinamento na filosofia moral de David Hume, Andreh Sabino Ribeiro; 12. O movimento razão-crença na interpretação da teoria da motivação de Hume, Franco Nero Antunes Soares; 13. Sentimentos e Normatividade em David Hume segundo Annette Baier, Giovani Lunardi; 14. Simpatia e aprovação moral da justiça na filosofia de David Hume, Denize Carolina da Cunha & Nivaldo Machado; 15. Do eu como feixe de percepções ao eu das paixões: Hume e a identidade pessoal no Tratado, Susie Kovalczyk dos Santos; 16. Imaginação em Hobbes e Hume: cadeias mentais reguladas e princípios de associação, Andrea Cachel; 17. Hume e o princípio fundamental da filosofia moderna, Rafael Bittencourt Santos; 18. A conexão necessária entre Hume e Malebranche, Bruna Frascolla; 19. Realismo ontológico e antirrealismo epistemológico na problemática sobre o mundo externo em Hume, Leandro Hollanda; 20. Uma possível inversão kantiana da tese humeana da inércia da razão, Carlos Eduardo Moreno Pires; Nota sobre João Paulo Monteiro, Rolf Nelson Kuntz. (shrink)

Os Ensaios Políticos de Hume tiveram uma enorme audiência e considerável influência sobre seus contemporâneos. Mas as reflexões de Hume sobre a política nem sempre tiveram a atenção que merecem, situação que ultimamente vem se revertendo graças a uma série de estudos que iluminam a sua importância. É por isso mais que oportuna a publicação desta edição dos Ensaios, enriquecida com o estudo de João Paulo Monteiro, que, de forma pioneira em língua portuguesa, soube situar o interesse de Hume pela (...) política no quadro mais amplo de suas preocupações filosóficas, bem como mostrar a relevância de sua ciência política, entendida como uma ciência do possível, fundada na experiência histórica, dedicada ao estudo das leis constitucionais e de seus efeitos sobre a sociedade, de forma comprometida com as questões e impasses políticos de seu tempo. Maria Isabel Limongi. (shrink)

Os Ensaios Políticos de Hume tiveram uma enorme audiência e considerável influência sobre seus contemporâneos. Mas as reflexões de Hume sobre a política nem sempre tiveram a atenção que merecem, situação que ultimamente vem se revertendo graças a uma série de estudos que iluminam a sua importância. É por isso mais que oportuna a publicação desta edição dos Ensaios, enriquecida com o estudo de João Paulo Monteiro, que, de forma pioneira em língua portuguesa, soube situar o interesse de Hume pela (...) política no quadro mais amplo de suas preocupações filosóficas, bem como mostrar a relevância de sua ciência política, entendida como uma ciência do possível, fundada na experiência histórica, dedicada ao estudo das leis constitucionais e de seus efeitos sobre a sociedade, de forma comprometida com as questões e impasses políticos de seu tempo. Maria Isabel Limongi. (shrink)

The aim of this text is to elucidate the concept of citizenship of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. This conception of citizenship can be denominated like Republican. For this, the concept of citizenship in Rousseau is addressed in three fundamental principles: freedom, equality and fraternity. Some traditional political conceptions of contractualism as Hobbes and Locke are considered, especially in relation to their conceptions of citizen. Following this, those fundamental aspects of the anthropology conceived by Rousseau are realized. Those allow to reach at the (...) construction of his idea of republic. In addition, the three fundamental principles, that characterize citizenship in the republican sense, are developed. And so the conclusion is the formulation of a truly democratic state from the perspective of Rousseau, inspired by the republican state of the ancients and where the people is properly the legislator of this. (shrink)

El amor cristiano es una exigencia que pretende la superación del egoísmo y el fomento del desarrollo positivo de las relaciones humanas al ayudar a los demás a ser independientes. No obstante, Søren Kierkegaard ha señalado en su obra que existen obstáculos mundanos y problemáticos que impiden que este tipo de amor se materialice efectivamente. Así pues, el objetivo de este texto es exponer el concepto de amor cristiano como exigencia ética radical y su capacidad como correctivo para las relaciones (...) humanas problemáticas en la sociedad a partir de Las obras del amor. Para esto, en primer lugar, expongo la vida oculta del amor, seguido de la descripción del amor de predilección, que es la forma particularizada del amor. Finalmente, me dispondré a dilucidar la exigencia radical del amor, en virtud de hallar la esencia del amor y cómo podría ser un correctivo para la práctica en las relaciones interpersonales de la sociedad. (shrink)

Son varias las posturas que sostienen que la relación de Jean-Paul Sartre y Simone de Beauvoir en el campo filosófico no encuentra mayores coincidencias, por lo que se sugiere la interpretación de que no realizaron un trabajo en conjunto en la construcción del existencialismo. Sin embargo, también son muchas las posiciones que otorgan un sentido de estrecho trabajo filosófico entre él y ella. A pesar de las distintas posturas, podemos encontrar claramente ciertas coincidencias en sus trabajos que ayudaron a la (...) construcción de esta postura filosófica. Este texto se propone analizar la defensa del existencialismo realizada por Sartre y Beauvoir en contra del pensamiento dogmático del siglo XX. A partir del existencialismo propuesto por ambos autores se intenta mostrar al hombre de manera abierta, sin adornos que lo definan de manera absoluta, negando entidades trascendentes que guíen su destino: el destino del hombre es lo que éste hace de sí mismo. Así pues, se busca presentar al existencialismo en contravía de cualquier rasgo de mistificación que se genere en el terreno de la existencia humana. (shrink)

I argue that The Metaethical Moral Relativism has been being used as a form of support in order to commit desire–belief actions against Human Biology Principia. The lacking of Moral Epistemology allows me illustrate and explain practical downsides in the Ontological part of Moral Knowledge. I recommend a departure from The Biological Basis of Morality in favor to avoid contemporary misuses in the Justification of The Metaethical Moral Relativism.

El campo interpretativo sobre la obra de Newton ha sido ampliamente discutido y, particularmente, el tema de las hipótesis no ha sido la excepción. El objetivo de este texto es mostrar que la filosofía natural de Newton pareciera, en principio, rechazar la hipótesis, pero en realidad no es opuesta a la formulación de estas, si diferenciamos a qué tipo de hipótesis se hace referencia. Así pues, se muestra, en primer lugar, cómo desarrolla Newton su filosofía natural, y cómo es contrapuesta (...) a las hipótesis. Luego se muestra que bajo condiciones determinadas las hipótesis son aceptadas. Y, por consiguiente, se concluye que la filosofía de Newton no rechaza radicalmente las hipótesis, sino que, por el contrario, se puede valer de su formulación para el progreso de la investigación científica, dependiendo a qué tipo de hipótesis se haga referencia. (shrink)

”La fe y la Razón son como las dos alas con las cuales el espı́ritu humano se eleva hacia la contem- plación de la verdad”, es la metáfora que define Juan Pablo II en su encı́clica Fides et Ratio, para darnos entender que estos dos conceptos no se enfrentan entre sı́, como la mayorı́a de personas lo creen, cuando en realidad son un complemento necesario para llegar a conocer a Dios y su amor infinito.

On the fog of the misunderstanding of the truth, the choking with the will begin. We can use the above sentence in order to generalize the terms werra (Frankish–German), bellum (Latin) and polemos (Greek), whose meanings hints in the draw of fighting. On the early stage of the beginning of all the times, this fog has blinded in the driving (i.e. conscious) between the movement of the natural human being and the actions of the man, making many generations believe that (...) the human psychology is not based in any summum bonum but in some summum malum, as Thomas Hobbes does on his book Leviathan [Ho]. (shrink)

The main objective of this paper is to address the problem of the philosophical method, which consists of the lack of consensus among philosophers regarding the proper procedure to carry out this human activity. In this sense, it examines a few methodological proposals put forward by some representatives of contemporary philosophy, emphasizing the impact that the development of modern science has had on such views. In addition, the plausibility of such proposals is assessed.

In this paper it is explored the relationship between the practice of philosophy and the development of a sort of professional intuition through it. That is to say, this paper is broadly concerned with a very traditional metaphilosophical topic, namely, the sort of abilities a skillful philosopher must possess to excel at philosophizing. More precisely, it critically examines the long-held common place in philosophy according to which the competences acquired through philosophical training are related to applying concepts. Such a view (...) has given way to the idea that philosophers gain expert intuitions -provided by philosophical training- about using concepts. In this sense, it has been shown in experimental philosophy that philosophers holding this notion of the practice of philosophy might be under the illusion of expertise. For these reasons, we argue, based on the work of the psychologist Deanna Kuhn, that philosophical expertise, on a more positive account, might be related to the evaluation, construction, and rebuttal of arguments. With this in mind, we also explore the relationship between intuition and arguments in philosophy. (shrink)

En Kierkegaard, la desesperación es analizada desde dos perspectivas. Por una parte, el individuo no sabe que posee un yo y, por otra parte, se sabe que posee un yo. Y esta última a su vez, puede ser en dos sentidos. El individuo desespera de la debilidad cuando no quiere ser sí mismo y desespera de la obstinación cuando quiere ser sí mismo. Este querer ser sí mismo lleva al hombre a sufrir y a enfrentarse a la idea de Dios, (...) a no querer ser fundamental por una fuerza externa, algo que no crea que provenga desde su interioridad. Este texto es un prólogo al libro de Judith Butler, La desesperación especulativa de Søren Kierkegaard, sin embargo, se presenta un enfoque en el cual el se menciona que el hombre que desespera de la obstinación de querer ser sí mismo. Por lo que se hace una exposición de lo que implica este momento de la desesperación, donde el hombre se llega a enfrentar al Poder que lo fundamenta. (shrink)

En este texto pretendo explorar cómo el pensamiento, una vez establecido como dominante en una determinada época histórica, puede perder su capacidad crítica original y transformarse en un instrumento de perpetuación del statu quo. En primer lugar, abordo la relación entre lenguaje y ciencia, considerando cómo la instrumentalización del lenguaje puede influir en la dirección de la ciencia y limitar su potencial transformador y crítico. En segundo lugar, profundizo en el problema de la razón instrumental y su impacto en el (...) dominio de la naturaleza, es decir, cómo la racionalidad instrumental puede conducir a una cosificación de la naturaleza y a una pérdida de la sensibilidad hacia el entorno. Finalmente, pretendo analizar cómo esta forma de pensamiento puede influir en las relaciones humanas, en la cultura, en la idea de progreso y en la concepción misma del individuo, afectando su capacidad de acción autónoma y su potencial emancipador. A través de este análisis me propongo arrojar luz sobre la compleja dinámica entre Ilustración, racionalidad y pensamiento administrado, y cómo esta interrelación puede impactar en la configuración de la sociedad y en el desarrollo de los individuos. (shrink)

This paper aims 1) to introduce the notion of theoretical story as a resource and source of constraint for the construction and assessment of models of phenomena; 2) to show the relevance of this notion for a better understanding of the role and nature of values in scientific activity. The reflection on the role of values and value judgments in scientific activity should be attentive, I will argue, to the distinction between models and the theoretical story that guides and constrains (...) their construction. The aim of scientific activity is to develop understanding of phenomena, and something that serves this aim and contributes to the development of understanding has a cognitive value. Cognitive values are the features that something that plays a role in scientific activity should have so that it can serve its aim. I will focus my attention on the features of the theoretical story and of the models. (shrink)

Con una metodología analítico-sintética, el propósito del presente artículo es ofrecer un fundamento teórico sobre la legitimidad de los actos y las decisiones morales. Por consiguiente, se resolverá la siguiente cuestión: ¿cuál es la función ética del derecho, en el marco del ejercicio de una conciencia y consciencia construidas por agentes morales? Se concluye que la coacción legítima debe fundarse en la protección universal de toda persona y en el sometimiento a objeciones por parte de los ciudadanos, con el propósito (...) de revisar la legitimidad y legalidad de las normas jurídicas. (shrink)

Experimental activity is traditionally identified with testing the empirical implications or numerical simulations of models against data. In critical reaction to the ‘tribunal view’ on experiments, this essay will show the constructive contribution of experimental activity to the processes of modeling and simulating. Based on the analysis of a case in fluid mechanics, it will focus specifically on two aspects. The first is the controversial specification of the conditions in which the data are to be obtained. The second is conceptual (...) clarification, with a redefinition of concepts central to the understanding of the phenomenon and the conditions of its occurrence. (shrink)

En Kierkegaard podemos encontrar un señalamiento fuerte de la tendencia de la sociedad de masas de la época manifestada ante sus ojos. De este tipo de consideraciones se podría partir para llegar a la idea de que Kierkegaard es un pensador social por su fuerte crítica social. Aunque el cristianismo no tenga pretensiones políticas, según el mismo Kierkegaard, la radicalidad ética pretendida por nuestro autor necesariamente se genera incomodidad social. Debido al exceso de postulados abstractos y a las falsas tendencias (...) en las relaciones que han gestado en la sociedad, el cristianismo se presenta como un escándalo y quien lo practique corre el riesgo de ser burlado y aborrecido. Este texto se centra en la crítica de Kierkegaard a la sociedad y, por tanto, en la dificultad de llevar a cabo el mandato del cristiano en ésta. Y, finalmente, ¿es Kierkegaard un pensador social? Se llega la discusión sobre las consecuencias y cuestionamientos sobre la posibilidad de considerar a Kierkegaard como un pensador social fundamental. (shrink)

This paper is an essay published under the title A Critical Praxis from the Americas: Thinking about the Zapatistas in Chiapas with Herbert Marcuse, Bolívar Echeverría, and Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, in Lamas, A. T .; Wolfson, T. & Funke, P. N. (Eds.). (2017). The Great Refusal: Herbert Marcuse and Contemporary Social Movements (pp. 329-342). Philadelphia: Temple University Press. The author kindly authorized the publication in Spanish version by Jhoan Sebastian David Giraldo and Cristian Leandro Sánchez Marín.

Making sense of modeling: beyond representation Content Type Journal Article Category Original paper in Philosophy of Science Pages 335-352 DOI 10.1007/s13194-011-0032-8 Authors Isabelle Peschard, Philosophy Department, San Francisco State University, 1600 Holloway Ave, San Francisco, CA 94132, USA Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 3.

It is sometimes said that simulation can serve as epistemic substitute for experimentation. Such a claim might be suggested by the fast-spreading use of computer simulation to investigate phenomena not accessible to experimentation (in astrophysics, ecology, economics, climatology, etc.). But what does that mean? The paper starts with a clarification of the terms of the issue and then focuses on two powerful arguments for the view that simulation and experimentation are ‘epistemically on a par’. One is based on the claim (...) that, in experimentation, no less than in simulation, it is not the system under study that is manipulated but a system that ‘stands-in’ for it. The other one highlights the pervasive use of models in experimentation. It will be argued that these arguments, as compelling as they might seem, are each based on a mistaken interpretation of experimentation and that, far from simulation and experimentation being epistemically on a par, they do not have the same epistemic function, do not produce the same kind of epistemic results. (shrink)

A brief overview of the current status of the scholarship on Heidegger and contemporary art and of the contributions included in the special issue.

This paper mainly addresses the relation between essentialism and philosophical method. In particular, our analysis centers on the anti-essentialist argument that proposed, given its essentialist bonds, the abandonment of the notion of method. To this end, we make use of the empirical evidence concerning essentialism provided by psychological research, which has shown that our proneness to essentialize is not a by-product of our social and cultural practices as some anti-essentialists have thought. Rather, it is a deeply rooted cognitive tendency that (...) plays a major role in concept formation and so in our understanding of things. Thus, given that such inclination toward essentialism is certain to happen, we argue for a conception of method that, while not overcoming such tendency, avoids the presumed disastrous consequences feared by most anti-essentialists. (shrink)

Interview with the author of "why We are in Need of Tails." Iguana Books, Toronto, Canada.

Readers are awaiting a new encounter with stories united under the common title Why We Are in Need of Tales. Let me remind you that these deep philosophical books were written by Maria daVenza Tillmanns, a professional philosopher dedicated to the study of philosophizing with children, who has gained valuable experience in this field. Maria’s books are inspired by her work with her students at El Toyon Elementary School in National City (California), with whom Maria held philosophy (...) with children classes for three years before COVID-19. With parental permission, the children provided their drawings, which are used as illustrations for the books. I read Why We Are in Need of Tales, Part III with great pleasure. The focus of this book is on making decisions, sometimes very hard decisions. In Part II, the focus is on dreams — hopes and wishes we have for life. This book looks at how we may best decide how to make those hopes and wishes come true. And the answer Huk and Tuk suggest is deceptively easy: by making decisions “with your eyes wide open.” (5, p. ix). The author of this excellent book managed to describe how to make decisions with your eyes wide open through the playful dialogue between Huk and Tuk. The books are written in dialogue so the reader immediately plunges into the context of a lively conversation. Dialogue not only sharpens attention, but also invites the reader to participate in the conversation. In this way, the reader becomes a listener at the same time. (shrink)

Human nature has always been a foundational issue for philosophy. What does it mean to have a human nature? Is the concept the relic of a bygone age? What is the use of such a concept? What are the epistemic and ontological commitments people make when they use the concept? In What’s Left of Human Nature? Maria Kronfeldner offers a philosophical account of human nature that defends the concept against contemporary criticism. In particular, she takes on challenges related to (...) social misuse of the concept that dehumanizes those regarded as lacking human nature (the dehumanization challenge); the conflict between Darwinian thinking and essentialist concepts of human nature (the Darwinian challenge); and the consensus that evolution, heredity, and ontogenetic development results from nurture and nature. After answering each of these challenges, Kronfeldner presents a revisionist account of human nature that minimizes dehumanization and does not fall back on outdated biological ideas. Her account is post-essentialist because it eliminates the concept of an essence of being human; pluralist in that it argues that there are different things in the world that correspond to three different post-essentialist concepts of human nature; and interactive because it understands nature and nurture as interacting at the developmental, epigenetic, and evolutionary levels. On the basis of this, she introduces a dialectical concept of an ever-changing and “looping” human nature. Finally, noting the essentially contested character of the concept and the ambiguity and redundancy of the terminology, she wonders if we should simply eliminate the term “human nature” altogether. (shrink)

In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' in which he claimed to present a counterexample to the so-called 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities' ('a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise'). The success of Frankfurt-style cases as counterexamples to the Principle has been much debated since. I present an objection to these cases that, in questioning their conceptual cogency, undercuts many of those debates. Such cases (...) all require a counterfactual mechanism that could cause an agent to perform an action that he cannot avoid performing. I argue that, given our concept of what it is for someone to act, this requirement is inconsistent. Frankfurt-style alleged counterexamples are cases where an agent is morally responsible for an action he performs even though, the claim goes, he could not have avoided performing that action. However, it has recently been argued, e.g. by John Fischer, that a counterexample to the Principle could be a 'Fischer-style case', i.e. a case where the agent can either perform the action or do nothing else. I argue that, although Fischer-style cases do not share the conceptual flaw common to all Frankfurt-style cases, they also fail as counterexamples to the Principle. The paper finishes with a brief discussion of the significance of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)

Creativity has often been declared, especially by philosophers, as the last frontier of science. The assumption is that it will defy explanation forever. I will defend two claims in order to oppose this assumption and to demystify creativity: (1) the perspective that creativity cannot be explained wrongly identifies creativity with what I shall call metaphysical freedom; (2) the Darwinian approach to creativity, a prominent naturalistic account of creativity, fails to give an explanation of creativity, because it confuses conceptual issues with (...) explanation. I will close with some remarks on the status and differences in some explanations available in contemporary cognitive science. (shrink)

In this Chapter, Maria Kronfeldner discusses whether psychological essentialism is a necessary part of dehumanization. This involves different elements of essentialism, and a narrow and a broad way of conceptualizing psychological essentialism, the first akin to natural kind thinking, the second based on entitativity. She first presents authors that have connected essentialism with dehumanization. She then introduces the error theory of psychological essentialism regarding the category of the human, and distinguishes different elements of psychological essentialism. On that basis, Kronfeldner (...) connects historical, socio-psychological, and philosophical insights in order to show that although essentialism can act as a catalyst for dehumanization, it is not necessary for it. Examples relate to dehumanization in the context of colonialism and evolutionary thinking, to the history of dehumanizing women from Aristotle to 19th-century craniology, and to contemporary self-dehumanization and ‘lesser mind’ attribution. (shrink)

In English, discourse reference to time involves grammatical tenses interpreted as temporal anaphors. Recently, it has been argued that conditionals involve modal discourse anaphora expressed by a parallel grammatical system of anaphoric modals. Based on evidence from Kalaallisut, this paper argues that temporal and modal anaphora can be just as precise in a language that does not have either grammatical category. Instead, temporal anaphora directly targets eventualities of verbs, without mediating tenses, while modal anaphora involves anaphoric moods and/or attitudinal verbs.

Reasons can play a variety of roles in a variety of contexts. For instance, reasons can motivate and guide us in our actions (and omissions), in the sense that we often act in the light of reasons. And reasons can be grounds for beliefs, desires and emotions and can be used to evaluate, and sometimes to justify, all these. In addition, reasons are used in explanations: both in explanations of human actions, beliefs, desires, emotions, etc., and in explanations of a (...) wide range of phenomena involving all sorts of animate and inanimate substances. This diversity has encouraged the thought that the term 'reason' is ambiguous or has different senses in different contexts. Moreover, this view often goes hand in hand with the claim that reasons of these different kinds belong to different ontological categories: to facts (or something similar) in the case of normative/justifying reasons, and to mental states in the case of motivating/explanatory reasons. In this paper I shall explore some of the main roles that reasons play and, on that basis, I shall offer a classification of kinds of reasons. As will become clear, my classification of reasons is at odds with much of the literature in several respects: first, because of my views about how we should understand the claim that reasons are classified into different kinds; second, because of the kinds into which I think reasons should be classified; and, finally, because of the consequences I think this view has for the ontology of reasons. (shrink)

The Eskimo language Kalaallisut (alias West Greenlandic) has traditionally been described as having a rich tense system, with three future tenses (Kleinschmidt 1851, Bergsland 1955, Fortescue 1984) and possibly four past tenses (Fortescue 1984). Recently however, Shaer (2003) has challenged these traditional claims, arguing that Kalaallisut is in fact tenseless.

Escribir hoy en día un libro sobre hermenéutica, que tal hermenéutica se refiera a la desarrollada por G. Gadamer en su conocido Verdad y método y que se pretenda añadir algo nuevo a lo mucho escrito sobre el tema parecería, a primera vista, empresa irrealizable. Que ambas pretensiones inspiren la sólida monografía de María G. Navarro —titulada Interpretar y argumentar— constituye empresa audaz y arriesgada, plena de coraje innovador, que provoca admiración, curiosidad e interés. Contra lo que pudiera parecer a (...) primera vista, el libro contiene un alto componente de originalidad y creatividad, debido a la estratagema metodoló-gica de que se sirve la autora. A saber, una hermenéutica in obliquo, estrategia consistente en interpretar a la hermenéutica gadameriana a través del prisma de la lógica de la argumentación. (shrink)

This paper argues that the so-called ‘paradox’ of dehumanization is a mirage arising from misplaced abstraction. The alleged ‘paradox’ is taken as a challenge that arises from a skeptical stance. After reviewing the history of that skeptical stance, it is reconstructed as an argument with two premises. With the help of an epistemologically structured but pluralistic frame it is then shown how the two premises of the Skeptic’s argument can both be debunked. As part of that it emerges that there (...) are a couple of ways how dehumanization can be realized, and one such realization can be sufficient for affirming the reality of dehumanization for a specific case. (shrink)

Rooth & Partee (1982) and Rooth (1985) have shown that the English-specific rule-by-rule system of PTQ can be factored out into function application plus two transformations for resolving type mismatch (type lifting and variable binding). Building on these insights, this article proposes a universal system for type-driven translation, by adding two more innovations: local type determination for gaps (generalizing Montague 1973) and a set of semantic filters (extending Cooper 1983). This system, dubbed Cross-Linguistic Semantics (XLS), is shown to account for (...) various phenomena — including scope relations in English and Greenlandic Eskimo, internally headed relative clauses in Lakhota, serial verbs in Yoruba and VP ellipsis in English. (shrink)

Ignorance is often a perfectly good excuse. There are interesting debates about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake subvert obligation, but little disagreement about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake exculpate. What about agents who have all the relevant facts in view but fail to meet their obligations because they do not have the right moral beliefs? If their ignorance of their obligations derives from mistaken moral beliefs or from ignorance of the moral significance of the facts they have in (...) view, should they be excused for failing to meet their moral obligations? It is not obvious that they should. In this paper we argue that the best non-skeptical accounts of moral responsibility acknowledge that factual ignorance and mistake will diminish moral responsibility in a way that moral ignorance and mistake will not. That is because factual ignorance is often non-culpable so long as it meets certain merely procedural epistemic standards but the same is not true of moral ignorance. Our argument is that the assumption that it is gets the standards of culpability for moral ignorance wrong, and that the mistake is encouraged by the thought that culpability in general requires an instance of known wrongdoing: that acting wrongly requires de dicto unresponsiveness to one’s obligations at some stage. We deny this and conclude that, therefore, ignorance and mistaken belief are indeed often perfectly good excuses – but far less often than some philosophers claim. (shrink)

Este trabajo tiene como objetivo examinar críticamente la discusión en torno a la identidad nacional panameña denominado el problema de lo panameño, particularmente aquellas perspectivas propuestas por filósofos profesionales, así como determinar su alcance y revisitar sus presupuestos. Con ello en mente, intentaremos contextualizar hasta donde sea posible dicha discusión, buscando poner de relieve los factores históricos que la motivan, además de evaluar la vigencia de esta.

Data involving epistemic modals suggest that some classically valid argument forms, such as _reductio_, are invalid in natural language reasoning as they lead to modal collapses. We adduce further data showing that the classical argument forms governing the existential quantifier are similarly defective, as they lead to a _de re–de dicto_ collapse. We observe a similar problem for disjunction. But if the classical argument forms for negation, disjunction and existential quantification are invalid, what are the correct forms that govern the (...) use of these items? Our diagnosis is that epistemic modals interfere with hypothetical reasoning. We present a modal first-order logic and model theory that characterizes hypothetical reasoning with epistemic modals in a principled manner. One upshot is a sound and complete natural deduction system for reasoning with epistemic modals in first-order logic. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a way of characterizing human agency in terms of the concept of a two‐way power. I outline this conception of agency, defend it against some objections, and briefly indicate how it relates to free agency and to moral praise‐ and blameworthiness.

Over the last four decades arguments for and against the claim that creative hypothesis formation is based on Darwinian ‘blind’ variation have been put forward. This paper offers a new and systematic route through this long-lasting debate. It distinguishes between undirected, random, and unjustified variation, to prevent widespread confusions regarding the meaning of undirected variation. These misunderstandings concern Lamarckism, equiprobability, developmental constraints, and creative hypothesis formation. The paper then introduces and develops the standard critique that creative hypothesis formation is guided (...) rather than blind, integrating developments from contemporary research on creativity. On that basis, I discuss three compatibility arguments that have been used to answer the critique. These arguments do not deny guided variation but insist that an important analogy exists nonetheless. These compatibility arguments all fail, even though they do so for different reasons: trivialisation, conceptual confusion, and lack of evidence respectively. Revisiting the debate in this manner not only allows us to see where exactly a ‘Darwinian’ account of creative hypothesis formation goes wrong, but also to see that the debate is not about factual issues, but about the interpretation of these factual issues in Darwinian terms. (shrink)